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Vol. MMXXVINo. 93

Field reports from cloud-security engineering, AI experiments, and a homelab that keeps getting bigger.

Latest writing from William Zujkowski

Start here: agentic security, tools, and homelab reading paths

Security·6 min read·

The Database Gets a Vote on Your Read-Only Agent

A disposable PostgreSQL lab tests what an agent-facing database role can actually do, including the SELECT that writes through a privileged function.

  1. Systems·3 min read·

    The Recovery Button Deserves a Dry Run

    Pilot Execution treats recovery as a state-changing program and previews its cross-component effects before committing the action.

  2. Security·8 min read·

    The Policy Is the Part That Moves

    A proved gate is only as good as the policy it enforces, and the policy is the part that changes while the agent is running. What OSCAL and the agent-authorization drafts both assume, and what breaks.

  3. Systems·4 min read·

    The Filesystem Should Start as a Specification

    SYSSPEC treats a filesystem specification as the thing an agent edits, then asks generated code to live up to the contract.

  4. Security·7 min read·

    You Can't Prove the Agent. Prove the Gate.

    Formal verification for AI-agent security. You can't prove a probabilistic model does the right thing — but the deterministic gate in front of it is small enough to prove outright. Dafny proofs, a Rego twin, and differential testing, following the method AWS used for Cedar.

  5. Security·7 min read·

    The Firewall Stays Put. The Agent Improvises.

    Rewriting security controls for probabilistic agents. Static control catalogs assume systems that do what they're told; AI agents don't — so here's how to express agent guardrails (tool allowlists, secret-egress denial, audit) as machine-checkable OSCAL component definitions.